In the joint operation of the US and Israel last Saturday morning, Isfahan, Qom and Karaj were targeted as well as Tehran, and Iran’s Religious Leader Ali Khamenei was killed. In retaliation, Iran organised missile attacks against Israel, US bases in the region and Gulf countries. The Strait of Hormuz was closed to ship passages. These developments drew eyes to the reaction China would give. In the first stage of the attacks, China adopted a cautious language at the level of "deep concern"; however, with the killing of Khamenei and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, that is, when China's direct economic interests came under threat, it raised its discourse to the level of "We strongly condemn".

As I emphasised in this column in recent weeks, China's positioning in the international system is based on two basic principles: the state directing the economy and establishing a network of strategic partners rather than allies. These two principles complement each other; China can conduct a flexible foreign policy without entering into legal obligations to anyone, because it has built a self-sufficient system internally. This flexible network, which is not based on an ideological mould like the Transatlantic Alliance or mutual obligations, is now read as foresight rather than weakness, with Trump wiping out the allies of the US in one stroke. Middle powers from Spain to Canada, from Korea to almost all of the developing countries, have entered the path of multi-partnerships due to the uncertainty created by the alliances they are in; there is no end to those stopping by Beijing on this path.

In Iran, as in Venezuela, China did not go beyond cliché statements at the beginning. Although it buys eighty per cent of Venezuela's crude oil, it settled for protesting Trump's coup; it announced that it would be involved in the negotiations regarding the post-Maduro period. The reason for this is as follows: China took its precautions in time and distributed its oil purchases in a balanced manner. Oil coming from Venezuela and Iran does not even reach twenty per cent of China's total needs. In other words, almost no dependency remains that would give a trump card to the US.

What actually disturbs China is not the US attacking Iran, but the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. The vast majority of the loads passing through the Strait go to Asia, especially to China. As the world's largest crude oil importer, China is the largest buyer of Middle East oil. Approximately 5 million barrels of crude oil reach China daily via Hormuz; this constitutes forty per cent of its total imports of 11.6 million barrels, and thirty per cent of its total supply of 16 million barrels.

Russia steps in at this point. Reaching its oil to Asia both by tankers via the North Sea and the Baltic and by railways and pipelines, Russia is not dependent on Hormuz. Last year, it produced 10.8 million barrels daily and exported 4.8 million barrels of this; nearly eighty per cent of the exports went to China and India. Therefore, Russia can fill part of the supply gap originating from Iran and Saudi Arabia, especially in the Chinese market. However, this situation pushes China into a position it would want to avoid in order not to risk Trump's visit to Beijing planned for April: creating a temporary front with Russia, albeit reluctantly.

The equation is also complex from this perspective: Since it is Iran that closed the Strait, China is trying to achieve two conflicting foreign policy goals, such as supporting Iran politically to force the US attacks to end at an earlier point, on the one hand, and not spoiling relations with Trump on the other. Because the suspension of the multi-billion dollar arms package approved by the US Congress to be sent to Taiwan before Trump's April visit shows that the field of negotiation with the US is already opening. China's hardening discourse is a message given to both Iran and the US within this framework.