DAILY INTERVIEWS

Dr. Zafer Yörük: The People’s Alliance has become a necessity

Dr. Zafer Yörük: 49% of the country has ousted this ruling party since 7 June. But there exists no political actor to bring this 49% to above 50%.

Dr. Zafer Yörük: The People’s Alliance has become a necessity

Serpil İLGÜN

The ruling front persists in its position it adopted on the evening of 31 March of not recognizing the poll results to the accompaniment of ever more blatant claims of violation and provocative comments. The situation is in constant flux in Istanbul as to which ballot boxes in which sub-provinces are objected to and in which of them invalid votes or all votes are to be recounted.

With Erdoğan describing the loss of important large cities such as Istanbul and Ankara as a “warning” in a veiled reference in his balcony speech, the regime media paints the picture of a “31 March electoral coup.” Regime newspapers, appearing with headlines of “victory” on 1 April, have since 2 April spoken of a need for the elections to be repeated, making allegations of impropriety/fraud.

There is ever greater concern as to where the chain of objections and the harshly provocative comments will lead to. With the opposition front, its spirits bolstered by the ruling block’s regression, counselling that these endeavours are in vain, the persistence in portraying the loss of the large cities as a coup and FETO operation give added force to the question, “Can the elections be annulled?”

I spoke to Political Scientist Dr. Zafer Yörük about the impressions the unconcluded election engenders.

Why have the results evoked this harsh reaction? Why is keeping hold of the large cities important to the ruling block? How will the results impact on the ongoing economic and political crisis and the AKP’s internal dynamics? Can Erdoğan, who says, “Even if they take them they can’t run them” to the prospect of cities like Istanbul and Ankara passing to the opposition, use trustees and the apparatus of economic embargo? What path will Erdoğan follow? Will the reforms and softening demanded by the Turkish Industry and Business Association come to pass?

How will the electoral attrition affect the MHP’s position? Zafer Yörük replied.

Let’s start with the ruling party’s claims of impropriety. Especially the ever more numerous objections in Istanbul, the description of the election result as a ballot box coup, the media’s perception management … How do you regard the process?

We realize from all this that they didn’t expect to lose Istanbul. They expected Ankara. This is why the threats against Mansur Yavaş were intensified and things were said to the effect, “We’ll take it even if he’s elected,” but Ekrem İmamoğlu wasn’t given much stick and this was due to them thinking there was no way Istanbul was up for grabs. When the truth hit home, I think there was an attempt to play for time. It looks like İmamoğlu will be given the certificate of election in the end.

What kind of results will not giving the certificate of election lead to? Because the thinking that the election should be repeated in Istanbul is becoming more widespread on the AKP front. Can the Istanbul elections be annulled?

If it isn’t given, the affair will well and truly attain a state of illegitimacy among the public. I also don’t think after all this Binali Yıldırım could take it in his stride and perform his duties as a legitimate metropolitan mayor. My guess is there’s a play for time.

Why?

There may be two reasons. One, there is the possibility of there being certain papers, documents etc. that need to be destroyed or hidden at the municipality. There may be an attempt to gain time for this. Secondly, to prepare their own public opinion for the result and to mollify the AKP electorate. There may also be a wish for an imparting of the message: “We didn’t immediately concede to the election results. We resisted and got a recount. We did what we could.”

And the third possibility is Binali Yıldırım being given the certificate of election. But, as I said, everyone is aware that this would not be a very legitimate move at this late stage. But everything’s possible with this ruling party’s mindset.

What’s your take on the ever-intensifying objections over Istanbul in conjunction with Erdoğan’s comment, “Istanbul is my love and my passion?” What sort of place does Istanbul occupy in Erdoğan and the AKP’s story?

Istanbul’s very important for the AKP story and it’s important for Erdoğan personally. It’s also very important for the history of Turkish political Islam. History changed course in Turkey after Erdoğan captured the Istanbul Metropolitan Mayoralty in 1994, 25 years ago. Ever since that day, Erdoğan has come to power in this county on the back of Istanbul’s graft and economic resources. Istanbul is a massive economic and political resource.

So, Istanbul is a psychological resistance point for both Erdoğan personally and his party as well as for the entire notion of political Islam; it is the place where the story started and sprang up. This movement cannot live for long without Istanbul, the source of fantastic wealth and earnings, in their grip. Being aware of this, Erdoğan gave Istanbul his all in the final days. But it wasn’t enough.

Ankara, too, has an importance close to that of Istanbul for the same story. Apart from having the status of capital, Ankara also has a psychological importance with it being a long story that started with Melih Gökçek. Adana and Mersin are also major losses. These will hit home as economic, political and psychological losses.

Debate about the objections raised against the ballot is accompanied by the prospect of “not letting them function” or “ousting from office.” Will the threats, “If they’re elected we’ll remove them from office” or “I’m the boss of the economy. How are they going to function?” find practical effect?

I don’t think there’ll be a problem in this regard. This is intimidation directed at the public in my view. What will they do? Will they besiege the cities and place them under blockade? Will an embargo be applied? Will there be plenty in other cities and shortages in CHP municipalities? As I’m familiar with the experience of Izmir municipality, let me give the example of Izmir. A huge operation was staged at the time of Fetullahists and the metropolitan municipality was rendered incapable of functioning; the municipality’s senior administrators and dozens of workers were detained and tried. The municipality was rendered incapable of functioning for a long time. They tried in this way to intensify people’s reactions but we saw that all this stiffened Izmir’s resolve further. I think they have drawn the lesson from this experience. Also, these cities that have changed hands are home to the majority of Turkey’s population. You cannot quarrel with the majority of Turkey. This is not practicable or sustainable. I think things of this nature were bandied about to create fear and change the public’s electoral preference.

“IF THE PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM CAME IN THE ECONOMY WAS TO SOAR - IT CAME UNSTUCK IN THE QUEUE FOR ONIONS”

Let me ask because for the duration of the election process Bahçeli and Erdoğan gave the message that the loss of big cities like Istanbul and Ankara would constitute an existential threat and open the system to debate and lead to chaos and confusion: how does these cities changing hands stack up in terms of the new regime’s institutionalization and legitimacy?

There are two ways we can look at the matter. One, a new regime is being set up and the country and state is advancing in another direction. Two, no regime or such like has been set up and basically the AKP is somehow incapable of healing the wound it took in the 7 June 2015 elections. A referendum is held, a presidential election is held, etc. And it gets hammered in them all and is trying to stay alive. This is how I compose the story. We witnessed a rise since November of 2002. There first came liberal promises and an Islamist stance and then various reversals were made. The Syrian civil war was greatly influential in the downturn. But this political rulership has been heading downward since 7 June 2015. Now, the final point has been reached on the bell curve or projectile motion graph.

So, I don’t think a system has been established. These are legal remedies as to how Tayyip Erdoğan is to continue his personal rule. The presidential system hasn’t worked out, nor is to be expected to. And the opposition must realize this and make the re-establishing of the parliamentary system into a goal.

The results are also being read as the electorate giving the message, “We don’t approve the presidential system.” Do you agree?

I don’t think the electorate is giving a message. This is a cliché-like thing. Neither I nor the electorate are minded to give a message. I’m engaged in political struggle. If the occasion arose, I would do it through strikes or marches-protests, but it isn’t possible because these actions are risky under an oppressive regime. I am just left with a ballot slip. If so, this is how I carry out political struggle. If we take a look at the other side, what is it that the citizen was promised? “If you hand everything over to us the economy will soar, the dollar will fall and everything will straighten out,” and so on. But it came unstuck in the queue for onions/potatoes. If you ask the average citizen apart from a fanatical pro-presidential system AKP supporter they’ll say, “The presidential system equals onions at ten lira.” They’ll say it means handing the economy over to the son-in-law. What the citizen understands is it’s something like the sultanate system. This is what I understand, too.

So, of course the presidential system hasn’t worked out and it won’t do so but has the citizen given the message, “This system hasn’t worked out so abandon it” in taking the metropolitan city municipalities from the ruling party? I don’t think so. The citizenry has voiced its objection in general terms to the government and is saying, “Bring it down.” That’s the message.

“THERE’S A LOSER BUT THE WINNING PARTY IS UNAWARE THAT IT HAS WON”

Do you think the opposition has got this message?

The truth is that there is an absence of a political will to comprehend that it has won just now. The ruling party also lost on 7 June 2015 but a winning party somehow didn’t emerge. There was a messing about with talk of, no, a coalition will be formed and discussions will be held, then something different happened on 1 November and in the meantime a lot of blood was spilled etc. So, the citizenry has ousted this governing party mentally since 7 June, at least 49% of the country has done so. But there exists no political actor to bring this 49% to above 50% and to really put this demand into political practice. The moves expected of the CHP have now come for the first time from Ekrem İmamoğlu. Muharrem İnce promised that he would stand by the ballot boxes, safeguard the poll until the end and would not let his rights be trampled on but failed to do so. Just as with Istanbul, asking for power is what Kılıçdaroğlu should have done for Turkey since 2015 and he still has not done so. In short, there exists a losing party on one side but the winning party is not aware it has won, at least this is how it has been for four years.

“THE VOTE OBTAINED IN INDUSTRIAL CITIES IS A PARTIAL SUCCESS OF SOCIAL POLICIES”

What is your take on assessments that the language of survival, threat and discrimination had a more decisive effect on electoral behaviour than the factor of crisis? How was it possible for the ruling block to keep hold of industrial cities like Bursa, Kocaeli or Zonguldak even with a reduced majority?

Bursa stayed in the ruling party’s hands with a tiny majority and is still open to dispute. Balıkesir is also up for dispute. If we add Adana and Mersin, which passed to the CHP, looking at the coastal strip starting from Thrace up to Hatay, we see the regions of Turkey that create the most economic value in agricultural and industrial terms. So, these are places where the economic crisis has hit home and they are no longer with the AKP. Earnings have fallen, there have been bankruptcies, dismissals, workers being sent on compulsory leave… Places where such things have been experienced a great deal. Hence, the economic crisis influenced electoral behaviour to an important degree.

As to the AKP winning certain cities whose populations include a heavy concentration of workers like Kocaeli and Zonguldak, this must be chalked up as a partial success of social policies. But these policies have displayed no continuity and this can be seen in the results obtained in other cites I have mentioned where the AKP was not an option that found favour as far as labour goes.

“THE MHP RETAINS NO IDEOLOGICAL STANCE”

How have the results affected the position within the coalition of Bahçeli-the MHP, who continue to stand at the AKP’s side over claims of irregularity/fraud?

The MHP has emerged from the election with an advantage. I don’t think the MHP took great losses in terms of provincial and sub-provincial municipalities. Above and beyond strengthening its position in the coalition, maintaining this unity has now become a necessity. With the MHP unable to get this many votes on its own if this block didn’t exist, the AKP, too, has come into a position in which it cannot stay in power if it breaks away from the MHP. The pair have created a symbiotic relationship of this kind.

I don’t think the MHP is left with any political argument. Survival was a very abstract argument and it found no uptake. The only thing it offers the MHP electorate is the goodies from being in power. It has in fact been one of the MHP’s long-time goals to get its people into various levels of the administration/state and it is pulling this off. And it is securing benefits in terms of directing tenders towards its cronies etc. I don’t think it retains any other ideological stance apart from this. In this sense, the MHP’s subsequent fate appears to be tied to the AKP’s rule.

"PERİNÇEK HAS REALIZED THAT THE AKP NO LONGER HAS MUCH OF A FUTURE AND IS TRYING TO OPEN UP ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE”

How do assess Patriotic Party Chair Doğu Perinçek’s comments in the immediate aftermath of the election, “On the upcoming agenda, the question of governance has entered a decision-making process for a Turkish national government?” Are the election results leading to a new quest for a broad Islamist-Turkist coalition?

Doğu Perinçek exaggerates a great deal. He presents himself in a greatly inflated form and still does so. These statements are the bluff: “I am leaving the AKP ship and I have a huge deep state behind me.” I don’t think anyone will be taken in by this bluff at this late hour. By speaking of a national unity government and so on, Perinçek is engaging in a fresh manoeuvre and is trying to open up living space for himself. Because he has realized that the AKP no longer has much of a future and, if there is to be another alliance, he is basically paving the way for his inclusion in it.

On the other hand, there is a need for debate as to whether the structure we call the deep state, Ergenekon, is a structure that is so homogeneous and capable of acting in unity, and, forgetting Perinçek, whether the MHP is that structure’s “official” representative.

On what basis do you say this?

It’s like this. Ever since the Susurluk accident and especially since the Ergenekon operations many elements of such a structure, like the Veli Küçüks, Levent Temizözes and Ağars, have been exposed. The Kemalist soldier members who constitute a more credulous component, for their part, have been and are being liquidated in both the Ergenekon and 15 July process. I think it has now turned into a show. The appearance of Ağar and Çiller at the AKP’s Istanbul Yenikapı rally projected the image, “If there is a deep state it is with us.” Of course, figures like Mehmet Ağar are influential in the state’s apparatus of violence and especially in counterterrorism structures, granted. But this comes down to the extent there exists a homogeneous deep state that guides Turkey’s policies and I’m not sure of this. Of course, there are groups and structures that want to guide things but I think the time has come to think that there doesn’t exist such a homogenous and decisive structure.

“NOBODY WILL BELIEVE TALK OF “WE’RE GOING TO START A FRESH MOVE”

Another moot point the election has ushered in is the kind of path Erdoğan will follow having lost the metropolitan cities. Will the outlook induce Erdoğan to change policies, what will the ideological, political and economic crisis evolve into, what will emerge from the cabinet reshuffle, and what do the demands “now is reform time” that capitalist circles are voicing amount to?

There is talk of such figures as Ali Babacan or Mehmet Şimşek being brought in to head the economy and the son-in-law being assigned another duty etc., but if Erdoğan has retained sufficient energy for such a turn, I would say “well done!” It looks like he has used all his weapons. As to what they will do from now on, my take would be that they’ll try to stay alive! They’ve actually been trying to do this since 7 June 2015. The new system and so on, all of this is stuff they’ve done out of the instinct to stay alive. What they call the new system is Carl Schmitt’s blueprint for conducting authoritarian politics in the liberal system. They’re taking decisions that will keep them alive and garnering power that they’ll apply single-handedly to the extent they can.

We’re living in a time in which the promises of delivering Turkey from a tutelage regime, solving the Kurdish problem and economic wellbeing and development when Erdoğan came to power are all moving backwards. This ruling party has lost its credibility as to taking these things forward once more. Nobody will believe the business of, “We’re going to start a fresh move.” At the very least, we would approach it with great suspicion as a society.

“WE MAY HEAR NEWS OF THE ESTABLISHING OF A NEW PARTY SOON”

What is your take on the internal repercussions within the AKP of the loss of important provinces, not least the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality? What is harbingered by news that Davutoğlu, Gül and Babacan are to establish a new party within one month regarding conflict within the AKP?

There is need for us to note somewhere that Abdullah Gül acts with great composure and has a character that shirks the limelight unless he has covered his back. There is talk anyhow of Davutoğlu being in a separate project. I think Davutoğlu took a huge hit from the Pelikan group when he stepped down as prime minister and the team he’ll be most wary of when he moves back into action is the Pelikan team. But I think Abdullah Gül and Ali Babacan, too, have made plenty of calculations about this possibility before making a move. But they are aware that with such a ready-made electoral backdrop in existence they can move into action and become a party having a number of deputies in parliament against the AKP. They will thus try not to lose this momentum but are bearing in mind that Erdoğan will lay into them with great anger. Their greatest fear is to be accused of Fetullahism, Arınç in particular was very wary of this, but I think the FETO accusation has by now ceased to be convincing, because there is nobody with involvement in political Islam and the AKP who hasn’t come side by side with Fetullah and down whose throat a single mouthful of maqluba hasn’t passed. The political leg file of the case is closed and it appears that it will remain so. They may thus have crossed this fear threshold and we may hear news of the establishing of a new party pretty soon.

“THERE WILL BE POLITICAL GAINS FROM HDP SOLIDARITY”

While being a topic for an interview in its own right, let me ask so it gets included within this general assessment: will the CHP, which didn’t make much noise about the HDP being pushed out of politics, subsequently value this support by the HDP and chart its policies accordingly?

I don’t think it will be able to maintain the same stance from now on. This, at the same time, means that, despite all the counterpropaganda and discourse of threat and fear (if the opposition is elected the HDP will run municipalities, the PKK will bring your water bill etc.), a political closeness has been forged between the CHP base and the HDP base. Following this solidarity, the CHP will have been robbed of its ability to make, for example, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu’s utterance of, “Lifting immunities is unconstitutional but we will say ‘yes’.” Or, it will no longer be able to act as a buttress for the AKP’s Syria policies. This is a political debt and so I think it will entail political gains.

“IT IS A GREAT SUCCESS TO ATTAIN 49% UNDER SUCH CONDITIONS”

With reference to the opposition, it also needs to be said that, despite such a monolithic media structure and the channels of political communications being blocked by the ruling party, the entire opposition including the CHP waged an important struggle. It is a great success to attain 49% under such conditions. This means that, under circumstances in which political communications not been prevented and turned into a ruling party monopoly, that is, had there been a fair election, this percentage would have been much higher. There’s a special need to congratulate the HDP, which was exposed to the most abundant of oppressive measures. If the HDP hadn’t taken that decision for the west, we would have been unable to obtain this result. And of course, there’s a need to congratulate Selahattin Demirtaş and he once more did what he could from jail with his kettle! The message, “Grin and bear it and vote against fascism” was very effective. The HDP succeeded in retaking most municipalities to which trustees had been appointed where the conditions were most disadvantageous, there was no security of life and under threat of imprisonment. It deserves congratulation. The HDP also deserves kudos for being the party that fielded the most women candidates in the local elections. The success of Dersim’s first communist mayor Fatih Maçoğlu also merits congratulation. Let’s not forget to salute the CHP for having for the first time brought a disabled person (Turan Hançerli) into office as mayor of an important sub-province like Avcılar.

(Translated by Tim Drayton)


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