DAILY OPINIONS

Is the construction of new Syria to commence from Qamishli?

How can the ascending US-Russia relationships impact the new period in Syria and especially Turkey’s attitude towards the Kurds, Damascus and Idlib?

Is the construction of new Syria to commence from Qamishli?

The bloody war for mandate ongoing since the first few months of 2011 in Syria seems to be going through its last two turning points lest any great surprises transpire. Following the capture of Daraa by the Syrian army, what remains is Idlib and the areas controlled by YPG and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). It was not long after mentioning the prevalence of methods of “military operation against Idlib, negotiation for Kurds” a few weeks ago that the commencement of talks between Damascus and Kurds recently was also announced.

According to the current scenario, it is possible to assert that Idlib will be left until after the process of negotiations with Kurds. Agreements involving few countries as its sides whereby jihadist formations in Idlib may be transferred to other regions or countries may also be the case.  A joint operation of the Syrian Army and YPG/SDF against this region is also a possibility.

Well then, is it a surprise for Damascus and the Kurds to have commenced negotiations? What has transpired such that two sides who have come very close to fighting until very recently have now sat around the negotiation table? Is it independence that Kurds want? Is Syria going to be partitioned? What will the position of Turkey and its impact be? These are some of the questions we hear frequently these days. We can add a few more. What will the political and administrative reflection of Damascus’ commencement of negotiations with the Kurds be on Syria? What will the state of YPG and its police force Asayish be? That the regions controlled by Kurds are resource-rich, including in terms of oil and agricultural production, is well-known. How are these resources to be apportioned and administered? And most importantly, is the US presence in northern Syria to be withdrawn? Will Kurds reconsider their relations with the US and return to their position of “having talks with all parties but remaining equally distant to them”?

According to the current situation;

- For those following the region closely, the commencement of talks between Damascus and the Kurds is no surprise. The Syrian army and the Kurds had clashed last year in Al-Hasakah, around Qamishli, in the region between Daraa and Deir Ez Zor. The lack of statements coming from Damascus apart from a few condemnations in the follow up of Turkey’s Euphrates Shield and the Afrin operations was interpreted in Turkey as Damascus’ selling out of the Kurds. However, it is necessary to assess the entirety of this political and military confrontations in the context of the US presence in Syria, a disapproving Damascus’ reaction in the aftermath of ascending Kurdish-US relationships and the attempts by sides to sit on the table to be established after the war ‘by strengthening their hands while weakening those of opponents’.

It is also useful to remind once again that Damascus and the Kurds have been conducting themselves since the beginning of 2011 on the basis of a search for an unwritten conciliation which has been shaped by itself according to the course of events. As such, they did not create fronts against one another, Kurds have received arms support from the Syrian Army many times, the radicals are the common threat for both sides. Amongst the elements determining the process stretching to the negotiations is also the prioritisations of secularism by the Kurds and being the only group that has implemented the model it advocated since the beginning of 2011 despite issues with its operation.

- Yet another thesis subject to frequent consideration by some sections, with Turkey in the forefront, depends on claims that Kurds are demanding independence. In the regions of Syria where Kurds are found, it is considerably evident fact that geographic, demographic or political independence is not possible. Names in the forefront of Syrian Kurdish front have also reiterated that this demand was not the case either. Countries such as Russia and Iran, which has become some of the sides of the process in the country has, on a number of occasions, emphasised the territorial integrity of the country as a red line for Damascus.

- Well if independent is not pertinent, what is the model being negotiated? This question does not as yet have a clear answer since the Kurdish side does not have a clarified demand of “a model with a certain framework, content or details.” Once the current situation is considered, it seems that the Kurds will be shaping their demands in accordance with the course of negotiations and the international support they will receive in this period.

Yet another concept recurring in the agenda frequently is that of autonomy yet as well as the lack of a common definition of the concept, the concept seems also to have a particular meaning depending on the one using it. It will be more appropriate to assess this situation less as a confusion but more as a concept whose content will be determined according to the course of these negotiations.

In conclusion, the sides have commenced negotiations but there are tens of subjects to be negotiated. For example, is the autonomy mentioned going to be economically determined in accordance with the appropriation of oil sources or demographically taking into account first the Kurdish-Arabic population? At this point, the most important question is this; as the negotiations begin to mature, is the model discussed going to be expressed with concepts such as “autonomy” or is a new model developed by the sides going to emerge?

- What is the legacy of YPG and its local police Asayish with its features of war experience and international going to be? According to the recent statements and what is discussed these days, YPG may be integrated into the Syria army. And the Asayish may remain as a local police force subordinated to the Syrian state.

- Yet what is Damascus’ model? The model discussed in Damascus for the last 4 to 5 years is based on a review of the constitution which has been suspended due to Martial Law and the strengthening of our local administrations. In this model, there are proposals for the devolution of power accumulated centrally at Damascus to local administrations, for strengthening local administrations and furnishing them with powers to determine their own needs and take their decisions to a certain degree. In this case, the onus for main public services, wage and basic rights is placed on the state. According to the current state, it can be asserted that Kurds do not consider this model too negatively, but it seems that many a detail will be shaped in accordance with the negotiations.

- The results of the negotiations in between Damascus and Kurds will not only be restricted with Kurds and will facilitate the development of a new governance system which will be implemented in the entirety of Syria. In this situation, even though Turkey strived to oppose the participation of Kurds with international processes including Sochi, the Kurds will make an undeniable contribution in the period when the new governance system of Syria is taking shape.

- One of the important points is this: are the negotiations between the Damascus and Kurds going to take shape in Sochi and Astana or will they enter the Genevan rail? Turkey is one of the parties to the Sochi and Astana. The participation of Kurds to either of these processes has not been possible due to Turkey’s blockage. As such alongside the results of the negotiations between Damascus and Kurds the preparation of a new constitution, going to a referendum and presidential and parliamentary elections are also impacted by this.

In short, due to reasons such as sanctions against Iran, the activation of the Russian-US diplomatic channels with Putin-Trump talks, Turkey’s increasing falling away from Russia and Iran about Syria, it is apparent that Sochi and Astana are fast losing their functionality. And again, the negotiation processes between the Damascus and the Kurds is relevant for the entirety of Syria as it is for the countries which have become a side to the war for the mandate in Syria. As such it is possible for the process of the Damascus-Kurdish negotiations and for the preparation of new constitution to be included in Sochi and Astana and together with that into the Genevan direction. Furthermore, it is a greater possibility for it to be carried to the Genevan processes in large part depending on the course of the negotiations and the positions of stake-holding countries with Russia in the forefront. As such it can be asserted that it will not be as easy as it has been in Sochi and Astana for Turkey to move against the Kurds.

Well, how can the ascending US-Russia relationships impact the new period in Syria and especially Turkey’s attitude towards the Kurds, Damascus and Idlib? Let us continue next week by turning to this issue.


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