China's President Xi Jinping has announced that he will attend Russia's Victory Day celebrations from 7-10 May, marking the end of the Second World War thanks to the USSR. The Chinese military is also sending a contingent to the four-day celebrations. How should we interpret this diplomatic move? Is it a confirmation of the unbreakable alliance between China and Russia, or a warning shot against the formation of other alliances?

Earlier in this column we asked whether we were heading for a second 'Cold War'. The accelerating struggle between the US and China for a share of global markets is, unlike the first Cold War, based on economic and technological conflicts of interest rather than ideological polarisation, and these conflicts are unfolding primarily on fronts such as supply chains and digital infrastructure. Military conflict is not the main agenda of this new Cold War, but Trump's threat to withdraw from NATO at the summit on 24-25 June sent a second shockwave through Europe, which had long since ceded its military defence to the US following Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

Another sign of Trump's retreat from the military sphere is his statement that the US would not abide by the internationally recognised agreements it signed to militarily protect Taiwan in the event of a possible Chinese invasion. In this scenario, a much-discussed possibility is the simultaneous outbreak of a hot conflict in both Europe and the Asia-Pacific, extending the Second Cold War from the economic to the military sphere. In this scenario, while facing reactions from international organisations and Europe, China would prove itself not only as an economic power but also as a military force in the eyes of the countries whose markets it seeks to expand, thus becoming a full-fledged superpower. This outcome would not be in line with the objective of the new Cold War initiated by the US against China. Consequently, Trump is also taking steps to isolate China in the political arena.

For example, Trump is intervening in the Russia-Ukraine war, which he claims does not concern him, and trying to force a ceasefire by talking to both Putin and Zelensky. The main focus of Trump's bilateral talks with Ukraine was energy security, and an agreement was signed on 30 April giving the US privileged access to Ukraine's rare earths in exchange for military guarantees.

Some have compared Trump's attempts to build a relationship with Putin to another Cold War tactic. Dubbed the "reverse Nixon manoeuvre", it is said that Trump is trying to isolate China by drawing Russia into the system, for example by readmitting it to the G7. In the first Cold War, Nixon brought China into the system by diplomatically recognising it and establishing economic relations, thereby isolating the USSR and upsetting the balance of power in the Cold War.

Russia is responding positively to Trump's moves because the war with Ukraine, which has not reached a definitive conclusion, is making Russia less powerful by the day. On the other hand, not wanting to sour relations with China either, Russia rejected the G7 proposal and reaffirmed its commitment to BRICS. Similarly, in an attempt to strike a balance between China and the US, Russia invited both to the Victory Day celebrations. Trump has not yet responded, but Xi, who had not responded positively to Trump's invitation to the US, announced that he would accept Putin's invitation. Xi's acceptance of Putin's invitation does not mean that China and Russia will launch a simultaneous military attack on the Baltic states and Taiwan as part of a military alliance, as suggested in the first scenario above. Entering into an uncertain military alliance with Russia during the ongoing trade wars with the US is not in line with China's strategy of steady progress. Rather, we can interpret this move as an intention to "reverse the Nixon manoeuvre" and prevent a rapprochement between the US and Russia.